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Abstract 
In the paper we use a unique new data set which has been collected in late 2006 in Ar-
menia,  Belarus,  Georgia,  Moldova  and  Ukraine  to  investigate  the  determinants  for 
short term migration and its destination and duration patterns. Special attention is 
paid to the role played by personal networks to Eastern and Western destinations as 
well as investments into the transferability of human capital made by migrants prior to 
their stay abroad. 
We find that many determinants and migration patterns are quite similar across the 
CIS countries under consideration but exhibit some surprising differences to standard 
results from the migration literature, e.g. the prevalence of older migrants and the low 
importance of children in the migration decision process. Networks and human capital 
transferability are the main explaining factors for the migration and destination deci-
sion, a result proofing robust after correcting for endogeneity.  
We expect that migration is likely to grow in importance for some countries at the 
European Borderlands, as networks develop and the costs of migration decrease. How-
ever, our analysis reveals that fears of brain drain have little substance as the educa-
tional background of migrants is rather low. As a considerable number of migrants 
have invested into destination country specific human capital prior to migration, this 
improved  human  capital  endowment  can  benefit  both,  migrants  and  the  society  of 
sending countries, alike. 
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1.  Introduction 
Although recent migrations from the new European Borderlands are increas-
ingly discussed, there is only little information on the quantity, determinants 
and patterns of these movements. Official  statistics on the flow of people in 
these formerly Soviet countries are typically scarce and sometimes misleading, 
while individual data in the form of survey results are generally lacking. Against 
this background the EU INTAS project “Patterns of Migration in the New Euro-
pean Borderlands: An assessment of Post-Enlargement Migration Trends in NIS 
Border Countries” (INTAS Ref. No: 04-79-7165) took the initiative, to collect 
survey based information on the migration situation in five former Soviet Union 
countries: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and the Ukraine. 
The paper takes advantage of this unique cross-country survey study which has 
been conducted with comparable survey methodology. It is the first thorough 
analysis of migration patterns in the region. Because interviews were conducted 
in the sending countries, we basically got information on those who have re-
turned after migrating abroad for a certain period of time. Thus, the strength of 
our survey is the inclusion of irregular and illegal migrants, independent of the 
way, people crossed the border and found a job in the receiving country. Fur-
thermore, the survey looked specifically at network relations in the migration 
process and tried to capture the efforts of individuals to ex ante acquire trans-
ferable human capital. Using the results of this comprehensive survey, we ana-
lyse the determinants of migration movements from the European Borderlands 
and  explore  the  factors  which  influence  the  duration  of  movements  and  the 
choice of destination regions. As a particular concern of this research we inves-
tigate whether standard results from the migration literature can be identified 
in the post-Soviet context. 
Our main findings are the following: Migration patterns are much in line with 
expectations from the economic literature on the motivations to migrate. How-
ever, we disentangle some post Soviet peculiarities such as the age structure of 
migrants. Migration networks and the general political orientation of the coun-
tries of origin strongly channel the migration flows to either Russia or the Euro-
pean Union. Human capital transferability proofs to be important and lends a 
strategic advantage to Russia, where language barriers are low. Yet, many mi-
grants  invest  in  improved  human  capital  transferability  already  prior  to  the 
move. These results support our intuition that migration at the European Bor-
derlands cannot be fully understood without taking into account the trade-off 
between  natural  human  capital  transferability  and  the  potential  to  make  in-
vestments or use networks instead.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we give the aim and moti-
vation for the study of migration patterns in the European borderlands. Section 
3 is a review of important theoretical considerations for the understanding of   3 
migration decisions and the way human capital investments and personal net-
works influence them. Section 4 gives an overview of the five countries under 
consideration  which  have  made  some  similar  transition  experiences  but  also 
differ especially in the political sphere. From this we expect to draw different 
conclusions for the motivations to migrate. Section 5 introduces the new data 
set. Section 6 describes the methodology and econometric approach employed. 
The results are reported in section 7 before we conclude with some relevant pol-
icy implications for both, migrant sending and receiving countries. 
 
2.  Aim and motivation 
With the political and economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe 
and later with the break-up of the Soviet Union, new migration opportunities 
manifested in the region, closely observed by governments and  public of EU-15 
countries. Fears of high numbers of immigrants from bordering Central and 
East  European  states  were  articulated  since  the  beginning  of  the  1990ies, 
strengthening in the light of the upcoming enlargement of the European Union 
which was expected to facilitate the movement of people from the new East 
European Union member states towards the EU-15. Against this background, 
transition regulations for labour migrations were introduced as a precondition 
for enlargement which allowed the EU-15 states to temporarily restrict the im-
migration of workers from the new East European Union countries (and vice 
versa).1 Nevertheless, labour migration from the new European Union members 
towards  the  EU-15  increased  after  enlargements,  primarily  directed  to  those 
EU-15 countries that had opted against immigration restrictions, as for example 
Great Britain and Ireland. In contrast to political concerns most studies found 
these recent movements in the final analysis economically rewarding. 
Recently, new migration challenges have been identified in countries either di-
rectly bordering the EU (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus) or being very close to its 
borders (Armenia, Georgia). Next to return migrations in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, studies found a growing motivation for labour 
migrations in the region, either towards European Union states, the USA and 
Canada, or to countries formerly belonging to the USSR, such as Russia. With 
respect to migrations in the new East European borderlands a tendency towards 
illegal border crossings, short-term and circular movements can be observed. In 
sending regions brain drain is seen with concern, while the receipt of remit-
tances is mostly considered rewarding for the economies and societies. On the 
side of receiving countries, especially in old and new European Union member 
states,  the  reaction  towards  a  potentially  increasing  migration  from  the  new 
                                                 
1 This regulation terminates in 2011.   4 
Eastern borderlands is mixed. While some politicians, labour market experts 
and representatives of enterprises promote a regulated labour migration from 
non European Union states in the light of aging societies and a mismatch in la-
bour markets, there exist a considerable opposition against new labour migra-
tions. The contra arguments include potential downward pressure on wages and 
growing unemployment prospects for natives, in addition to expected social ten-
sions resulting of an increasing social and cultural diversity. To enter into the 
debate about the likely outcomes of migrations in the new East European bor-
derlands, solid information on the background, structure and direction of these 
movements is required. It is the aim of this study to identify the core patterns of 
economic migration movements in this region, drawing on key arguments of 
migration theory and on a unique data base. 
 
3.  Theoretical considerations and empirical findings 
In this section we want to review basic theoretical literature on the determinants 
of migration decisions, migration duration and choice of destination regions, to 
identify the key factors driving and channelling labour movements in Former 
Soviet Union countries.2 Furthermore we present some empirical findings on 
these issues, focusing primarily on economic migration. 
One  of  the  most  influential  theoretical  approaches  to  explain  international 
movements,  the  neoclassical  theory  of  labour  migration,  emphasizes  the  re-
sponsibility of wage differences between different countries or regions for the 
movement of people. In a scenario of free mobility, workers would move from 
countries with lower wages to those with comparatively higher wages. In cases 
where unemployment is considered the probability of finding a job has to be 
considered  (Harris  and  Todaro  1970).  In  testing  this  theoretical  assumption 
many studies found a statistically significant positive effect of income differen-
tials on migration movements (Borjas 1987, Clark et al. 2002, Mayda 2007). 
Although this proofs the driving force of income differences in migrations, the 
comparatively straightforward argumentation of neoclassical economics can not 
convincingly explain those frequent empirical cases where high wage differences 
between countries are not accompanied by substantial migration relations. Fur-
thermore it is often observed that neither the poorest countries nor the poorest 
parts of migration sending regions are heavily involved in labour movements, 
what could be expected in a neoclassic world (Massey 2005, Hatton and Wil-
liamson 2005). 
In an effort to model migration decisions more realistically, human capital the-
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive survey on migration theories see Bauer and Zimmermann 1998 and Massey et al. 
1998.   5 
ory focuses on individual decision-making and highlights the influence of hu-
man capital characteristics in the migration process (Sjaastad 1962). According 
to human capital theory, people move if the discounted values of expected re-
turns to individual human capital - reduced by migration costs - are bigger in 
the immigration than in the home country. Incorporating individually deter-
mined migration gains and costs which include the costs for travelling, informa-
tion and income losses in the migration process, as well as the psychological 
costs of leaving family, friends and the home country environment strengthen 
the explanatory power of the model. In this framework, human capital charac-
teristics, such as gender, age, education, work experience, language competen-
cies etc. essentially determine migration decisions. 
The human capital model allows exploring the gender aspect of migration and 
helps characterize female and male migration motivations. Gender specific mi-
gration research has put forward hypotheses which emphasize family and socie-
tal factors beside individual characteristics in shaping the differences of move-
ments between men and women (Boyd and Grieco 2004). According to these 
approaches,  females  in  traditional  societies  migrate  less  often  than  in  more 
open ones and they are  typically more attached to their children and dependent 
relatives at home than men. With respect to age, the human capital approach 
would expect younger persons to be more likely to migrate, as their compara-
tively long working career ahead offers the largest profits from moving abroad. 
In addition, the young have less invested in home country specific human capi-
tal compared to older age cohorts thus being more inclined to leave. This is re-
flected in many past and contemporary (labour) migration flows, which pre-
dominantly consist of people in the beginning of their working career. Empirical 
studies confirm the relationship between younger age and higher migration in-
tentions, pointing in some cases to an inverse U-shaped age-migration pattern 
(Stark and Taylor 1991). 
In looking at education, the work experience and language competencies as well 
as the transferability of these forms of human capital to the receiving economy 
is expected to be an essential determinant of migration. The more likely the 
transferability of individual human capital, the greater should be the incentive 
to go abroad. It is often assumed that this is especially the case with higher 
skilled individuals. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the effect of higher educa-
tion and longer work experience on migration is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
higher educated individuals may find better employment at home and thus feel 
less pressure for emigration, on the other hand, they may also face better em-
ployment opportunities abroad and generally tend to have lower migration costs 
due to more effective and efficient search strategies for transportation, housing 
and foreign employment. It has to be considered though that in a number of 
cases only low-skilled segments of labour markets in receiving economies are 
open to immigrants, making it not attractive for highly-skilled workers to move   6 
(Stark and Taylor 1991). 
In the framework of human capital theory migration duration and destination 
can likewise be modelled on the basis of individually expected gains, costs and 
risks which are defined in dependence of migrants’  demographic and labour 
market characteristics. In this context, it may be favourable for migrants to opt 
for a certain (limited) time span and for a particular destination region. In the 
case of short term migrations, for example, the nexus between younger age and 
migration intentions should be weaker than in the case of long-term movements 
as temporary migrants typically do not plan to build a career in the destination 
country. Shorter movements can also be predicted for females with family obli-
gations,  particularly  in  more  traditional  societies  or  communities,  while  this 
may not be the case for men. With respect to higher education and destination 
country specific language skills we would predict these factors to result in longer 
stays abroad.3 Concerning destination regions, the argumentation in the context 
of human capital considerations is straightforward: all forms of destination spe-
cific skills, talents and knowledge should strengthen movements towards that 
respective region. 
In migration research evolved an increasing literature on the investment of im-
migrants into skill transferability and its earnings effects after migrating into a 
foreign country (Chiswick et al. 2005, Chiswick and Miller 2007). This a poste-
riori concept for improvements into human capital transferability is typically 
used to explain the U-shaped earnings function of immigrants in the country of 
destination. In building on this work we suggest to introduce a priori invest-
ments  into  human  capital  transferability  (for  example  language  acquisition, 
training courses etc.) which would capture the efforts of individuals to prepare 
migrations ex ante in accumulating (destination country) specific human capi-
tal.4 We believe that this new concept is particularly helpful in explaining dura-
tion and destination of migration movements in a post-Soviet setting. 
Is it realistic that individuals decide on migration independently? And are in-
come perspectives the most important driving forces to move? A comparatively 
novel theoretical approach, the new economics of labour migration, rejects the 
purely individual point of view and the dominance of earning differential in ex-
plaining the movement of people. It is argued that households are the relevant 
decision making unit and that the failure of capital, credit and insurance mar-
kets are responsible for migration movements in the first instance (Stark 1991). 
                                                 
3 However, Dustmann (2001) and Dustmann and Weiss (2007) found that return migrants may be moti-
vated to come back because they have accumulated human capital abroad which improves their earnings 
potential in the home country. 
4 Chiswick and Miller (2007: 22) support this hypothesis as they found a tendency among labour immi-
grants in America to move into higher skill levels after arrival than indicated by their level of schooling. An 
argument in this context is that those people, when planning to migrate, invested into country specific 
human capital of the receiving economy.   7 
Cases in kind are developing countries, where rural households can only survive 
under market conditions if they make capital investments and insure their pro-
duction against risks. Likewise, workers in a number of transition economies 
are only marginally protected from unemployment risks. Health insurance sys-
tems collapsed and credit markets to finance the start up of a (small) business 
or private housing do not exist or function properly. In these economies, fami-
lies may send its members abroad to earn money for risk insurance and capital-
building.  In  this  context,  the  migration  decision  of  households  can  be  inter-
preted as a portfolio strategy to diversify family incomes.  
Whereas the economic theories presented above refer to the labour supply side 
in the migration process, some economists point to the demand for labour in 
segmented labour markets as the initial incentive for international movements 
(Piore 1979). In advanced industrial societies, labour market segmentation is 
characterized by a primary labour market with secure employment conditions, 
comparatively high wages and social security standards, and a secondary labour 
market with a highly variable demand, low wages, little security and adverse 
working conditions. Because native workers are drawn into the primary sector 
of the economy and in many cases are not willing to accept secondary labour 
market  jobs,  immigrant  labour  is  recruited.  Under  these  conditions  demand 
growth for workers in the secondary labour market presumably translates into 
increasing immigration, since enterprises are not willing to pay higher wages 
and improve labour conditions in secondary markets as a precondition for at-
tracting native workers. Particularly non-traded goods sectors – that can not be 
outsourced and do not require high skill levels – can be expected to be charac-
terized by segmentation and the demand for low skilled immigrants. In the case 
of governmental recruitment programs or bilateral contracts on labour migra-
tions it can be argued that the inflow of foreign workers is to a considerable ex-
tend demand driven. Zimmermann (1994) showed for the labour recruitment 
era in Germany that the business cycle explained immigration flows to a consid-
erable extent, thus confirming the role of the demand side in this labour move-
ment. 
While economic arguments were highlighted so far, social relations have been 
shown to shape and support the movement of people to a considerable extent. 
In  this  context  network  theory  argues  that  migrant  networks  develop  across 
time and space which stabilize and potentially increase population movements. 
These networks are traditionally defined as connections between migrants and 
non migrants in the countries of destination and origin through ties of kinship, 
friendship, ethnicity or shared community. Because migrant networks reduce 
the costs and risk of movements, they are expected to increase the likelihood of 
further migrations (Massey et al. 1998: 42). In the empirical literature there is 
strong support for the relevance of ‘family, friends and neighbours’ effects in 
migration movements (Munshi 2003). However, recent studies have observed   8 
that network relations in migration processes often relate to recruiters, smug-
glers, consultants and other agents who support the movement of people be-
cause of financial interests (Krissman 2005). Stephen Castles (2007: 361) has 
labelled this development ‘migration industry’, where all kind  of commercial 
agents facilitate the movement of people and the job search of (illegal) immi-
grants. According to various studies, the existence of agencies to help and pre-
pare migrants for their stay abroad is widespread in many post-Soviet countries 
(IOM 2005). 
The theoretical arguments presented above allow us to formulate a number of 
hypotheses with respect to the determinants and characteristics of movements 
in countries belonging to the new European borderlands. All of these states ex-
perienced economic and social transitions after the break up of the Soviet Union 
which  resulted  in  growing  poverty,  job  losses,  increasing  social  inequality,  a 
break down of social security systems and market failures. Against the back-
ground of this scenario we assume individuals to decide on migrations in con-
sidering expected gains and costs of moving abroad in dependence of their hu-
man capital endowment. Furthermore we suggest that the individual decision to 
move is related to the family strategy in coping with the obstacles of transition 
societies. In line with the literature reviewed we anticipate younger individuals 
with no kids and comparatively little family obligations being more inclined to 
leave. Females are expected to be less likely to go abroad than men, although the 
comparatively open societies in Eastern Europe with a high percentage of work-
ing and well educated women may mitigate this widespread behaviour a bit. 
With respect to education and work experience we tend to follow the argument 
that higher educations and skills may not pay off, as immigrants from Eastern 
Europe in many cases do not get a chance to make use of their talents, particu-
larly in the West. Special competencies, however, that can easily be transferred 
into the sending country or are a precondition for certain jobs there (language 
skills,  for  example)  should  strengthen  the  motivation  to  move.  Likewise,  all 
kinds of networks, relations to ethnic communities or migration agents should 
contribute to a higher preference for going abroad. 
Finally we would like to put forward an argument that is often denied in identi-
fying the determinants of labour movements. This refers to migration policies 
and institutional barriers in sending and receiving countries. Although labour 
migrants from the CIS in general face little control in leaving their home coun-
tries, the entrance to other states for work, especially to the West, is restricted. 
This contributes to high costs and risks, because individuals willing to migrate 
have to cope with these problems by either paying an agent to cross the border 
and finding a job or relying on networks. In both cases migrants may neverthe-
less risk a life in a foreign country without legal entrance and labour permits. 
Against this background it can be expected that migration policies and entrance 
barriers of receiving countries will influence the duration and the destination   9 
choice of movements. 
 
4.  Countries under consideration: stylized facts 
The countries we are looking at here – Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine - were all part of the Soviet Union, thus sharing common economic and 
political experiences and common transformation challenges after the break-up 
of the Soviet Union. Although all of these countries went through specific migra-
tion episodes after becoming independent, some common patterns exist. Be-
cause the collapse of the Soviet Union triggered the return of its populations to 
their (former) ethno-national homelands, migrations in the initial post-Soviet 
era were characterized by the dominance of ethnic exchange movements. While 
ethnic Russians, having lived in Belarus, the Ukraine or Moldova moved back to 
their former home countries; Ukrainians, Belarussians or Moldavians who had 
settled (or were forced to settle) in other Soviet Union republics returned to 
their  newly  independent  nation  states.  Beside  ethnically  motivated  return 
movements, a number of post Soviet states also experienced considerable emi-
grations because of political conflicts and ecological catastrophes. In Georgia for 
example political unrest and ethnic clashes triggered huge emigrations, whereas 
in Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Spitak earthquake drove 
people out (Yeganyan 2006). These movements were primarily directed towards 
neighbouring states formerly belonging to the USSR. Between 1990 and 2006 
approximately 80% of emigrants from former Soviet Union states moved within 
the CIS region, predominantly towards Russia (Mansoor and Quillin 2006: 3). 
According to official data the Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia experi-
enced remarkable net emigrations between 1991 and 2005 (see Figure 1). Migra-
tion losses in this period ranged from 1.2% of the population (575 thousand 
people) in the Ukraine to 22.6% of the population (982 thousand people) in 
Georgia. To the contrast, net immigrations prevailed in Belarus, reflecting con-
straint emigration opportunities and a population with little experience in in-
ternational movements.  
Overall, official migration data indicate a general decrease of migration activi-
ties  in  the  new  East  European  borderlands  since  the  middle  of  the  1990ies, 
pointing  to  declining  ethnic  exchange  movements  within  the  CIS  countries 
(Mansoor and Quillin 2006: 5). In this period, migration movements in the re-
gion underwent two remarkable changes: the share of people leaving for the 
West increased and economically motivated movements gained in weight (Man-
soor and Quillin 2006:5, Malynovska 2006). While the USA, Germany and Is-
rael had been the most important Western destinations in the initial migration 
period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the later period an increasing 
number  of  Western  countries,  particularly  in  the  European  Union,  were  ad-
dressed by CIS emigrants.   10 
Based on the official data presented above (see Figure 1), net migrations in all 
countries under consideration here followed a decreasing trend since the end of 
the 1990ies which contradicts the empirical observation, that Russia as well as a 
number  European  Union  states  faced  an  increasing  immigration  from  the 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in that period (OECD 2006). This inconsistency 
is due to the fact that only persons who receive an official permission to reside 
abroad  (Ukraine,  Belarus)  or  those  who  cancel  their  residence  permits 
(Moldova, Georgia) are officially registered as emigrants in these states. Citizens 
of post Soviet countries who leave on the base of family visits and tourist visa, 
who participate in bilateral agreements for short-term work or in a student ex-
change program are not counted in official emigration statistics. Besides, illegal 
border crossing or overstaying add to an increasing number of citizens from 
post Soviet states, living and working abroad.5 
In the light of theoretical considerations presented above, the growing economic 
migration intentions in the new European borderlands should reflect disparities 
in income, wealth and quality of life between sending and receiving regions. Ac-
tually, in comparing the GDP per capita in the new European borderlands (Bela-
rus, the Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia) with corresponding data in 
Russia and some EU countries, considerable differences in living standards can 
be observed in these geographically adjacent regions (Table 1). 
Further arguments that explain the growing dynamics of economically moti-
vated migration in the European borderlands relate to network relations, such 
as  former  contacts  in  the  framework  of  the  Warsaw  pact,  ethnic  affiliations 
across borders, linguistic ties in the case of Russia and specific migration tradi-
tions connected to former ethnic return movements. Borders between the new 
European Union members and former CIS countries had been porous until the 
year 2003, when visa procedures were introduced. In spite of that the various 
minority populations on both sides of the new Eastern borders of the European 
Union  create  strong  network  connections.  For  instance,  in  Zakarpathia 
(Ukraine) near the Hungarian border, live approximately 151,000 ethnic Hun-
garians. The Polish minority of 140,000 people in Ukraine settled near the Pol-
ish border, while ethnic ties to Ukraine prevail on the Polish side as well: The 
official  statistics  register  312,000  Polish  citizens  who  have  been  born  in  the 
Ukraine (OECD 2006: 269). Since the introduction of the new law on citizen-
ship in Romania in 2003, approximately 530,000 Moldavian citizens have ap-
plied for a Romanian passport (Kennedy 2007). Moldavians who can demon-
strate that they, their parents, or their grandparents lived in Moldova when it 
was part of Romania before the end of World War II are eligible for dual citizen-
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migration, a number of studies confirm the growth of illegal labour migrants with a CIS country back-
ground (Mansoor and Quillin 2006, Rodriguez Rios 2006).   11 
ship. This makes it obviously easier for economic migrants to travel to European 
Union countries. 
Economic and network arguments point to a considerable emigration pressure 
in  the  region  under  consideration;  while  this  pressure  is  generally  not  con-
strained by laws of sending countries, migration movements are severely re-
stricted by legal measures on the part of most receiving states. Particularly mi-
grations into the European Union are restrained by policies which control the 
inflow of (labour) migrants, for example in the context of bilateral contracts on 
labour movements. Nevertheless, labour migrants from former CIS countries 
can be expected to enter or work illegally in economically better off countries, as 
long as basic migration incentives persist. In this context migration networks 
and agencies are assumed to play a decisive role in fostering movements into 
states that close their borders towards immigrants. 
 
5.  Data description 
Data 
We use quantitative data from Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
which were collected in a multi-stage sampling framework by the INTAS project 
(ethnosurvey). The questionnaire was identical across countries. In each coun-
try, several regions were selected to conduct approximately 400 household in-
terviews,  summing  up  to  2,003  households  in  the  sample.  Households  were 
sampled according to probability of inclusion in the sample proportional to size 
(PPS)  and  are  representative  for  sub-regions.  The  sample  was  restricted  to 
adults younger than 76 years.  
The survey covers information on household and individual specific characteris-
tics, on stays  abroad  and destinations between 2004 and 2006, on personal 
networks, on investments into human capital transferability as well as on future 
migration plans. Migrants in our sample are persons who have been abroad at 
least once for at least 3 month but have returned to their country of origin after 
the last trip. Therefore it has to be kept in mind that our definition of migration 
is restricted to short-term migration and that our results cannot be generalized 
to various types of movements. 
 
Dependent variables 
A  variable  overview  and  descriptive  statistics  are  given  in  Table  2.  The  first 
seven variables are the dependent variables used in the multivariate regression 
analysis. The variable migrate indicates whether a person has been abroad be-
tween 2004 and 2006 for at least 3 consecutive months and has turned home 
since. Therefore it has to be kept in mind that our analysis is restricted to return   12 
migrants and that determinants and patterns of migration for permanent emi-
grants may vastly differ. Nevertheless, the largest share of migrants in the post-
Soviet  space  can  be  considered  short-term  migrants  (Mansoor  and  Quillin 
2006). 
The destination of migration is measured as discrete variables covering the des-
tinations  Western  Europe  including  the  new  EU  members  (EU-27),  Russia 
(which is by far the most important recipient country of the Former Soviet Un-
ion) and other overseas destinations (e.g. USA, Canada, and Japan).  Migration 
duration is cardinally measured in month. For the whole sample,  the mean is at 
half a month, but the average of the true migration duration ranges between five 
and ten months in the different countries when accounting for migrants only 
(Table 5).  
 
Independent variables 
The independent variables used in the analysis comprise demographic informa-
tion such as gender, marital status, age. To account for household specific con-
ditions which might prevent or hamper migration (e.g. the presence of small 
children or elderly persons above 75) we include dummy variables. Education is 
included  as  a  proxy  for  general  human  capital.  We  create  three  educational 
categories and include lower education (no secondary education) and univer-
sity degree into the regressions. The majority category of having finished secon-
dary education is being omitted from the regressions as base category. The next 
two variables are proxies for social networks in both Western and Eastern desti-
nations and indicate whether a person has a potentially supporting friend in 
either  or  both  of  these  destinations.  Westfriend  indicates  having  a  personal 
network to a country of the EU-27 while russfriend means having social con-
tacts with people in Russia. Since especially older people may have networks to 
a broad array of countries in the Former Soviet Union due to Soviet work ex-
perience and military service, networks to several countries of the Former Soviet 
Union may exist. Nevertheless, Russia is the most likely destination country in 
terms of economic advances why we decide to restrict the network variable to 
Russian friends. The following two variables are linked to human capital, as they 
describe knowledge of a western language6 and investments into improving the 
transferability of skills between the country of origin and country of destination 
(e.g. training courses). The latter (INVEST) is a binary variable taking the value 
of  unity  if  the  respondent  has  participated  in  language  courses,  courses  for 
qualification improvement or studies on the life conditions in the country of 
                                                 
6 We do only consider non-Slavonic languages (English, Spanish, Italian, German, Portuguese, French, 
Greek and Norwegian were the languages known by respondents) and are aware of the fact, that e.g. speak-
ing Polish might by no means be less useful human capital. However, different language distances make it 
difficult to disentangle the true level of knowledge.    13 
prospective residence. Our survey considers only human capital acquired prior 
to migration. The last variables in Table 2 are controls for settlement type and 
country fixed effects. 
 
6.  Methodology 
To estimate the determinants of migration of individual i we make use of a sim-
ple probit model of the following reduced form: 
i i i i C X p e g b + + = = ) 1 Pr(       (1)       
where a normal distribution is assumed for the outcome variable and the error 
is orthogonal to the explanatory variables X including human capital transfer-
ability an networks as well as controls C. A utility maximizing individual will 
chose migration if the costs (transportation as out-of pocket costs as well as psy-
chological costs) are offset by the economic gain (the expected wage in destina-
tion minus the foregone earnings at home). As noted before, investments into 
human capital transferability are costly prior to the move, but they tend to re-
duce the costs post-migration. Besides, they increase the expected wage and/or 
the propensity to get a job at a given wage. After the investment has taken place, 
the  costs  become  sunk,  so  we  expect  these  investments  to  foster  migration. 
Above, INVEST could also proxy how serious individuals were about their mi-
gration plans in the past.  
The choice of migration destination can be easily captured in the framework of 
utility  maximization.  Person  i  will  chose  migration  destination  j  if  il ij U U >  
for l j ¹ . Utility of individual i can be split into an observable and an unobserv-
able part: 
ij ij ij V U e + =                     (2) 
To  analyze  migration  destinations  we  estimate  a  conditional  logit  model  in 
which an individual is faced with the option to either migrate to the EU, to the 
RUSSIA, to overseas or not to migrate at all. It is important that this discrete set 
of choices satisfies the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives assumption 
(IIA). The error term is extreme value distributed and iid, i.e. not correlated 
across choices. The probability of an individual choosing destination j can be 




















                (3) 
where  x  represents  explanatory  variables,  among  which  we  assume  personal 
networks to play a pronounced role as they lower the cost for migration.   14 
Generally, the IIA assumption is rather restrictive, since changes in the charac-
teristics of one destination may distort the migration choice. Nevertheless, we 
use a small number of destinations which relaxes restrictivity a bit. Above, Train 
(2003) and Christiadi/Cushing (2007) have shown that violations of the IIA 
might  not  drive  result  insufficient  if  individuals’  preferences  are  of  interest 
rather than migration forecasting.    
To understand the duration of migration we have to take into account that gains 
and  costs  from  migration  are  not  constant  over  time.  The  larger  the  out-of-
pocket migration cost, the longer an individual has to work abroad to reach the 
“break-even”  of  the  migration  investment.  On  the  other  hand,  psychological 
costs may rise steeply as time passes, especially in the presence of family in the 
country of origin. On the political side, visa regulations often limit the stay of a 
person abroad or force her to turn illegal by overstaying the visa. Estimating the 
determinants of migration duration with OLS would yield biased, inconsistent 
and inefficient estimates for count data (Long 1997). We make use of a non-
linear model for which we assume a Poisson distribution. The probability that 








=                   (4) 
The model is subject to the strict assumption of equidispersion of mean µ and 
the variance of y. To investigate potential misspecification of the Poisson model, 
we  estimate  a  negative  binominal  regression  model  where  over  dispersion 
(delta) is constant across observations (NBRM model). Another problem of the 
count data application is the potential bias through excess zeros. Many indi-
viduals have not made any migration experience over the preceding three years, 
thus exhibiting “zero” months of duration. However, the process producing ze-
ros because of not migration may strongly differ from the process determining 
the counts of time abroad. What is necessary is a model which is capable of dis-
tinguishing  between  both  processes.  In  applying  a  zero  inflated  negative  bi-
nominal  regression  model  (ZINB  model),  we  introduce  an  inflation  variable 
which is strongly associated with the production of zeros stemming from the 
absence of positive migration decision in the past. We argue that having another 
person with migration experience in the household does impact on the decision 
whether to migrate. However, migration duration should be almost uncorre-
lated since many exogenous factors such as employment opportunities and con-
ditions abroad as well as visa regulations will prevent from perfectly aligning 
migration stays. Indeed, the pair wise correlation coefficient of having another 
migrant and the household and own migration duration is weak and insignifi-
cant exhibiting the necessary property for this instrument. 
For several regressions we split the sample into urban and rural households. 
This is due to the fact that employment opportunities are scarce in rural areas of   15 
the former Soviet Union and might thus lead to different determinants of migra-
tion patterns. Another distinctive feature we account for is different migration 
determinants for men and women. While the underlying  assumption for the 
interpretation of the female dummy in the full sample regression is that gender 
is only a shift parameter, the split of the sample allows for qualitative differ-
ences in determinants of migration decisions. The presence of children, for ex-
ample, is expected to impact in a different way on the decisions of men and 
women. 
 
7.  Results 
Descriptive statistics 
A comparison of migration patterns can be seen from Table 3. The data reflect 
unweighted information. It is obvious that Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are 
countries with high levels of past migration experiences above 10 percent, while 
migration is less common in Armenia and Georgia. Men tend to migrate about 
twice  as  often  as  women,  in  Armenia  five  times  as  often.  Only  in  Georgia, 
women comprise the larger share of migrants. In all countries but Belarus, mi-
gration is a rural phenomenon. 
In all of the countries except Ukraine, migration to Russia comprises the largest 
share of migration; the destination split between East and West is almost equal 
in Belarus. Men and women tend to choose similar destinations for all countries 
of origin, but the settlement type influences the destination decision differently 
across countries: While in Armenia rural migrants head for the EU, their urban 
counterparts migrate to Russia. The opposite holds for Moldova. 
Table 5 reports migration durations exclusively for migrants. While Belarus-
sians and Georgians spent on average five to six months abroad during the pre-
ceding 36 months, Armenians, Moldavians and Ukrainians went eight to ten 
months  abroad.  In  the  latter  two  countries,  men  and  women  stay  about the 
same time away from home, while Georgian women spend more than twice as 
long abroad than their male counterparts. In Armenia and Belarus, male mi-
grants spend substantially more time in the country of destination. The longest 
stays abroad (more than ten months) are performed by rural or male Armenians 
as well as Moldavians and Ukrainians in urban settlements. 
In Table 4 we take a closer look at personal networks to both destinations (West 
and East) as well as to language knowledge and past investments into improved 
human capital transferability. Social networks to Russia are stronger than West-
ern networks in Armenia and Belarus, but only marginally for the latter. In all 
three other countries, the networks to the West are much denser than to the 
East. Men’s network ties to the East are stronger than women’s and eastern 
networks exhibit a stronger gender bias than western networks (which are quite   16 
equally distributed between sexes). International networking is higher for urban 
respondents which might be caused by scarcer communication facilities in rural 
areas. Notable exceptions are Belarus (Russian networks are rural) and Moldova 
(EU networks are rural). Self-reported Western language skills are especially 
strong in Belarus and Georgia, they are stronger among women and in urban 
settlements. The latter probably reflects better educational facilities and migra-
tion agencies in urban areas. Ex ante investments into human capital transfer-
ability are around 30 percent in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and much lower 
in Armenia and Belarus. However, the gender split shows that men tend to in-
vest  more  prior  to  migration  which  might  be  a  strategy  to  catch  up  with 
women’s better language skills. Similarly, investments are higher in rural areas 
with the notable exception of Belarus (where facilities in rural areas are scarce) 
and Ukraine.  
 
Multivariate regression results 
In the following section, we provide results for the multivariate regressions to 
characterize migration patterns, controlling for several factors influencing the 
migration decision. Table 6 presents marginal effects of eight regressions con-
cerning the determinants of migration. All regressions have a reasonable fit. The 
first four regressions show that being a women and being above 50 years old 
strongly discourages migration. Also, a university degree lowers the propensity 
to migrate, while lower education weakly enhances migration. Children and be-
ing married play a surprisingly unimportant role in preventing migration. Only 
when restricting the sample to the high migration countries Belarus, Moldova 
and Ukraine, the presence of small children up to five years significantly reduces 
the propensity to migrate by five percent. 
Networks do not seem to have a very strong impact on the migration decision. 
Only when restricting the sample to high migration countries and more so when 
considering  only  rural  respondents,  network  contacts  to  Russia  significantly 
increase  the  propensity  to  migrate.  Potentially,  weak  “professional  migration 
infrastructure” in rural areas leads people stronger to rely on personal interac-
tion. Knowledge of a western language, however, is a positive determinant for 
migration. Likewise, having invested into improvements of human capital trans-
ferability fosters migration. When restricting the sample to urban vs. rural as 
well as male vs. female respondents, it becomes clear, that determinants of mi-
gration differ across space and gender: Being married, younger than 25 or older 
than 50 has a significant and much stronger effect in rural compared to urban 
areas. This can potentially indicate more traditional social roles in rural areas. 
Likewise, the effect of high or low education is stronger  in rural settlement. 
Comparing the determinants for men and women exhibits gender specific pat-
tern. Very young and older men are less likely to migrate as compared to their   17 
female counterparts; young women are even especially likely to emigrate. This 
pattern might be explained by the demand structure for migrants abroad: While 
men mostly work in construction or agriculture, i.e. heavy labour, the highest 
demand for women labourers is in home caring and nursing which can be per-
formed without any age restrictions. As expected, the presence of small children 
has an especially strong discouraging effect for women, but not for men. Being a 
university graduate discourages men from migration, potentially because they 
can find employment at home more easily than women. Education of women, 
on the contrary, does not play a significant role. As we learnt from Table 4, 
western  language  knowledge  is  more  widespread  among  women,  raising  the 
migration propensity for those men who do speak a foreign language strongly. 
We report the determinants of the destination choice in Table 7. The omitted 
base category for the estimation is the choice of no migration. Thus the coeffi-
cients have to be interpreted in comparison to the group without migration ex-
perience. In our context, the main interest lies in the comparison of the coeffi-
cients between the two main destinations for Eastern European migrants: the 
EU and Russia. It turns out that gender, age and education are strong determi-
nants of the destination choice. Women are more likely to migrate to the EU 
than to Russia. In most age groups, migrants and non-migrants do not signifi-
cantly  differ,  irrespective  of  the  destination.  However,  older  migrants  prefer 
other  post-Soviet  countries  and  are  extremely  unlikely  to  migrate  long  dis-
tances, as e.g. to the USA or Canada which are captured in the “other” category. 
Also having school children or a person older than 75 in the household, reduces 
the propensity to migrate far distance. Education seems to play an important 
role in the choice of an Eastern destination only, but after controlling for west-
ern language skills, university graduates become less likely to migrate to West-
ern Europe as well. We find that personal networks are more important in de-
termining migration to the East with the expected positive coefficient for having 
Russian friends abroad. Networks to the West are outperformed by western lan-
guage skills, which are an extremely important driving force for attracting peo-
ple. In comparing countries of origin, we find that Armenia and Belarus are less 
likely to send migrants to the West, while individuals in Georgia are slightly less 
likely to go to Russia as compared to the EU. In these results we find a reflection 
of political orientation of the countries under consideration. Moldavians, how-
ever, are strongly biased towards migration to the East. 
More details can be studied with separate estimations for men and women (re-
sults not shown). Highly educated men are especially unlikely to go to the EU or 
to Russia, while low education strongly fosters their choice of going to the East. 
This result strengthens the argument that young men often work in the con-
struction sector, especially in Russia. The largest share of those men has rather 
low education. Lower educated and older women do not chose Western Europe 
as a destination. While for both sexes, language skills play a similarly important   18 
role for choosing the Western destination, the impact of social networks seems 
especially  strong  on  men.  Having  Russian  friends  significantly  lowers  the 
chance to migrate to the West or overseas, while it significantly increases the 
choice of Russia. For women, the impact of social networks is statistically not 
significant different from zero. 
The determinants of the migration duration are reported in Table 8.  All but the 
regression for the sub samples considering only women and urban residents, are 
plagued by over dispersion and excess zeros, thus making the estimation of a 
Zero inflated negative binominal regression model (ZINB) necessary. The re-
maining two regressions only suffer from over dispersion, while the Vuong test 
indicates no serious problems of excess zeros here. Thus we estimate Negative 
binominal regression models (NBREG). The interpretation of the coefficients is 
straightforward: The constant reports the average migration duration for a mid-
dle-aged (36 to 49 years), unmarried, male, Ukrainian migrant with secondary 
education who lives in urban areas and has no children. Potentially the constant 
may  be  downward  biased  since  singles  are  underrepresented  in  our  sample. 
Georgians and Belarussians stay about one month shorter abroad than the com-
parison group. Women, married individuals and university graduates migrate 
for shorter stays abroad, while older migrants and persons with a higher level of 
human capital transferability stay significantly longer. When splitting the sam-
ple along geographic and gender lines, it becomes clear that the duration reduc-
ing effect of being married only holds for women and rural respondents. In rural 
areas, young migrants tend to stay significantly shorter periods of time abroad. 
An interesting pattern arises for dependent population groups in the household: 
Small children significantly reduce the length of stay for men only, while having 
a dependent elderly in the household shortens the stay abroad for urban house-
holds. The first result is quite puzzling and requires further analysis, while the 
explanation for the latter could lie in the contribution of elderly persons to the 
income generation process of households. As a study on poverty in Ukraine re-
vealed, pensioners tend to positively contribute to household incomes resulting 
in  reduced  propensities  of  facing  economic  hardship  (Brück,  Danzer  et  al. 
2007). As a kind of “insurance” elderly might lower the necessity for earning 
money through migration as a stable stream of income is available. 
 
Robustness checks 
In the following we deal with two potential sources of bias to our analysis: Pool-
ing of countries and potential endogeneity of variables. 
The first question which arises in a cross-country study concerns the issue of 
comparability.  We  use  Chow  tests  to  check  whether  pooling  of  observations 
from different countries is applicable. The tests do not indicate that determi-
nants for migration decisions, destination and duration of migration differ a   19 
great deal between countries7. Thus we feel safe with the implemented country 
fixed effects in our analysis which have to be interpreted as shift parameters.  
Estimating the effect of personal networks on the migration destination has a 
serious caveat: Since we cannot observe an individual’s whole migration experi-
ence, it might be the case that personal networks exactly exist because of migra-
tion  experiences  prior  to  our  period  of  analysis.  To  test  whether  our  results 
might be biased as a result of network endogeneity, we make use of the ap-
proach proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988). As in all tests of endogeneity we 
first have to find convincing instruments. We decide to instrument both friend-
ship networks to the EU and to Russia. Investments into human capital trans-
ferability are a priori investments, but language skills could be endogenous as 
well. For that reason, we also instrument the knowledge of a western language. 
Our instruments are geography based as they take the average regional density 
of networks and of language knowledge, respectively, multiplied by household 
size. The rationale behind these instruments is the following: In regions with 
many people connected abroad, my potential access to their helping hand is lar-
ger. Another potential instrument for friendship network to the East is being 
orthodox. 
Table 9a shows that all instruments have the desired properties: They are highly 
correlated with the potentially endogenous regressor but uncorrelated with the 
dependent variable. Table 9b reports the z-statistics of the second stage for the 
predicted first stage residuals. In the Rivers-Vuong approach this statistic can 
be interpreted as a simple test of the exogeneity hypothesis of the instruments. 
In case the statistic shows a certain level of significance, the regressors can be 
assumed to be endogenous and require the use of instrumental variables. As 
becomes clear from the table, both networks should be instrumented in the es-
timation of the Western destination, while the estimation of the Eastern desti-
nation is plagued by endogeneity to a much lesser extent. Language does not 
seem to exhibit any endogeneity problem. When instrumenting both destination 
equations, the Wald test of exogeneity failed to reject the null for exogeneity of 
networks  in  case  of  migration  to  the  Eastern  destination.  This  can  be  inter-
preted as some confirmation that endogeneity plays less a role for this migration 
process. Thus we present only results for the simple probit and IV probit for mi-
gration to the West in Table 9c. The qualitative results are similar in both equa-
tions, but we obviously lose precision in the IV estimation. Interestingly, after 
accounting for endogeneity, the positive effect of western friends for westward 
migration vanishes, while the discouraging effect of eastern networks remains 
strong. 
 
                                                 
7 Statistics not shown.   20 
8.  Summary and Policy Implications 
Our paper has explored migration patterns in Eastern Europe in terms of the 
migration decision, destination and duration of past migration experiences and 
future intentions to migrate. 
Among  the  important  determinants  to  migrate  are  individual  demographic 
characteristics and household conditions. Two results are noteworthy by inter-
national standards: the surprisingly low importance of the presence of young 
children on the migration decisions and the high share of older migrants. Hu-
man capital and networks rank especially prominent in determining patterns of 
economic migration and lead us to the conclusion of increasing importance of 
short term migration for the countries under considerations, as migration net-
works rapidly develop and human capital becomes better transferable across 
space. Moldova, however, has already extremely high levels of migration while 
Belarus is more strictly regulated. Much depends on the economic performance 
of Eastern European countries, which directly impacts on the migration deci-
sion in the form of push factors. An examination of the relationship between 
poverty and migration was beyond the scope of this paper. However, we will 
turn to this important field in our future research. 
Several policy implications can be drawn from our analysis, both for the coun-
tries of origin and the countries of destination. For Eastern European countries, 
an important insight is that many determinants of migration do not greatly dif-
fer from what is observed in other parts of the world. In recent years, personal 
networks have been established, which make potential migrants better informed 
and thus less risk-exposed as concerns their experience abroad. Also, the threat 
of human trafficking, a topic beyond the scope of this paper, can be most effi-
ciently prevented by established links between country of origin and destination 
and by designing cost-reducing migration schemes.  
Fears  of  brain  drain  have  not  been  substantiated  in  our  analysis8.  Migrants 
come from various educational backgrounds and many already invest ex ante 
into the transferability of human capital to the destination region, e.g. by learn-
ing a foreign language. This finding indicates that migration can be treated as an 
investment made by individuals. The role of human capital seems to be well un-
derstood  by  migrants;  the  investment  pays  off  a  double  (private  and  social) 
dividend: First, for the migrant who improves personal human capital to earn 
higher incomes and, second, for the countries of origin through increasing levels 
of education and skills. These results provide tentative and indirect support for 
the potential of brain gain in migrant sending countries. 
The major back draw for migrant sending countries lies in the high potential for 
social problems in families. As noted above, the presence of children does not 
                                                 
8 However, it should be noted again that we do not consider permanent migration.   21 
prevent from migration. Social policy has to be aware of these detrimental ef-
fects which are likely to result in high numbers of social orphans, as observed in 
the case of Ukraine in recent years9. 
For the countries of destination we will restrict ourselves to two major implica-
tions for the European Union which received high importance in the political 
debate. The first concerns fears of immigration from Eastern European coun-
tries. Despite focussing on short term migration only, we want to stress that mi-
gration is economically motivated and that migrants prepare and invest into 
human capital transferability to get employment in the EU. Permanent immi-
gration and social benefit abuse may be weak objectives. Second, the educa-
tional background of migrants coming to the EU is quite low. Most likely, highly 
qualified workers, who the EU increasingly intends to attract, do prefer other 
destinations. Potential reasons may be the rather immigration opposing politi-
cal culture in Europe (as e.g. compared to the USA), strict regulations on visa 
issuing and on the acceptance of educational certificates and so forth. However, 
our analysis also clearly reveals the importance of the language barrier which 
makes Russia an attractive destination for many Eastern Europeans. 
                                                 
9 We thank Natalia Astapova from the UNICEF office Kiev for this information.   22 
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Table 1: GPD per capita (PPP, 2000 constant US $), Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, 
Russia, various European Union countries 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Germany  23,257  23,631  24,118  24,591  25,342  25,618  25,579  25,521  25,945  26,210 
Italy  23,222  23,648  23,981  24,438  25,302  25,741  25,750  25,559  25,578  25,381 
Spain  19,057  18,742  20,555  21,420  22,312  22,844  23,119  23,421  23,757  24,171 
Portugal  15,653  16,254  16,960  17,550  18,147  18,392  18,397  18,064  18,172  18,158 
Czech Rep.  14,651  14,559  14,461  14,672  15,222  15,671  16,004  16,579  17,269  18,273 
Poland  8,578  9,179  9,632  10,070  10,548  10,723  10,878  11,307  11,913  12,318 
Armenia  1,932  2,019  2,183  2,269  2,417  2,663  3,029  3,468  3,846  4,846 
Belarus  3,578  4,003  4,360  4,524  4,800  5,045  5,323  5,728  6,416  7,044 
Georgia  1,594  1,786  1,863  1,939  1,997  2,117  2,259  2,536  2,713  2,993 
Moldova  1,381  1,408  1,320  1,279  1,310  1,395  1,509  1,614  1,739  1,868 
Ukraine  3,864  3,782  3,744  3,772  4,035  4,450  4,728  5,215  5,892  6,092 
Russia  6,173  6,277  5,961  6,368  7,005  7,380  7,765  8,376  9,021  9,647 







Table 2: Variable overview 
 
variable  N  mean  sd  min  max 
           
migrate  2003  0.081  0.273  0  1 
west (EU27)  2003  0.026  0.161  0  1 
russia  2003  0.041  0.198  0  1 
otherdest  2003  0.014  0.117  0  1 
duration  2003  0.643  2.930  0  36 
female  2003  0.636  0.481  0  1 
married  2003  0.672  0.469  0  1 
age1725  2003  0.219  0.414  0  1 
age2635  2003  0.249  0.432  0  1 
age3649  2003  0.372  0.484  0  1 
age5076  2003  0.158  0.365  0  1 
kid05  2003  0.188  0.391  0  1 
kid510  2003  0.179  0.384  0  1 
elderly75  2003  0.076  0.265  0  1 
loweredu  2003  0.049  0.217  0  1 
secondary  2003  0.639  0.480  0  1 
university  2003  0.311  0.463  0  1 
westfriend  2003  0.105  0.307  0  1 
russfriend  2003  0.049  0.217  0  1 
westlanguage  2003  0.336  0.472  0  1 
INVEST  2003  0.249  0.433  0  1 
urban  2003  0.686  0.464  0  1 
rural  2003  0.314  0.464  0  1 
armenia  2003  0.200  0.400  0  1 
belarus  2003  0.200  0.400  0  1 
georgia  2003  0.201  0.401  0  1 
moldova  2003  0.200  0.400  0  1 
ukraine  2003  0.200  0.400  0  1 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations 
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Table 3: Migration patterns and migration intentions 
 
  Total    women  men    urban   rural  Country of 
origin                 
Armenia  migration 2004-06  3.2%    1.4%  7.6%    3.1%  4.1% 
    - destination EU27  0.7%    0.4%  1.7%    0.3%  2.7% 
    - destination Russia  2.3%    0.7%  5.9%    2.5%  1.4% 
                  
Belarus  migration 2004-06  10.2%    7.4%  14.6%    11.7%  4.7% 
    - destination EU27  4.3%    3.3%  5.7%    5.1%  1.2% 
    - destination Russia  5.0%    2.1%  9.5%    5.4%  2.4% 
                  
Georgia  migration 2004-06  1.7%    1.9%  1.4%    1.7%  2.0% 
    - destination EU27  1.0%    1.1%  0.7%    1.0%  1.0% 
    - destination Russia  0.2%    0.4%  0.0%    0.0%  1.0% 
                  
Moldova  migration 2004-06  13.5%    10.3%  18.0%    12.1%  14.4% 
    - destination EU27  3.0%    1.7%  4.8%    3.2%  2.9% 
    - destination Russia  9.7%    7.7%  12.6%    8.9%  10.3% 
                  
Ukraine  migration 2004-06  11.7%    8.7%  16.9%    10.6%  14.3% 
    - destination EU27  4.3%    2.8%  6.8%    4.0%  4.8% 
    - destination Russia  3.5%    2.4%  5.4%    3.3%  4.0% 
                  
Total  migration 2004-06  8.1%    5.7%  12.2%    7.3%  9.9% 
    - destination EU27  2.6%    1.8%  4.1%    2.6%  2.7% 
    - destination Russia  4.1%    2.5%  6.8%    3.5%  5.4% 
N    2003    1273  730    1375  628 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations 
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Table 4: Personal networks and human capital transferability 
 
  Total    women  men    urban  rural  Country of 
origin                 
Armenia  EU friend  21.8%    19.9%  26.3%    23.0%  16.2% 
  Russian friend  36.3%    33.0%  44.1%    38.7%  25.7% 
  Western language  22.2%    23.8%  18.6%    24.5%  12.2% 
  HC INVESTment  9.5%    6.4%  16.9%    8.6%  13.5% 
                 
Belarus  EU friend  21.0%    21.1%  20.9%    24.1%  9.4% 
  Russian friend  24.5%    21.5%  29.1%    22.2%  32.9% 
  Western language  47.0%    53.7%  36.7%    54.0%  21.2% 
  HC INVESTment  20.3%    19.4%  21.5%    23.5%  8.2% 
                 
Georgia  EU friend  35.0%    35.6%  33.8%    38.9%  23.0% 
  Russian friend  21.3%    23.1%  18.0%    22.1%  19.0% 
  Western language  40.2%    47.0%  27.3%    46.5%  21.0% 
  HC INVESTment  34.2%    31.1%  40.3%    26.7%  57.0% 
                 
Moldova  EU friend  57.5%    58.8%  55.7%    51.0%  61.7% 
  Russian friend  26.5%    22.7%  31.7%    26.8%  26.3% 
  Western language  24.5%    26.6%  21.6%    27.4%  22.6% 
  HC INVESTment  30.0%    30.0%  29.9%    21.7%  35.4% 
                 
Ukraine  EU friend  34.3%    32.9%  36.5%    36.5%  29.4% 
  Russian friend  16.2%    15.5%  17.6%    19.7%  8.7% 
  Western language  34.0%    34.9%  32.4%    36.9%  27.8% 
  HC INVESTment  30.5%    29.4%  32.4%    32.5%  26.2% 
                 
N    2003    1273  730    1375  628 






Table 5: Average migration duration in month (among migrants only) 
 
Total    women  men    urban  rural  Country of 
origin               
Armenia  8.3    2.5  10.9    6.3  15.0 
Belarus  4.6    3.7  5.3    4.7  4.0 
Georgia  5.7    6.8  3.0    6.0  5.0 
Moldova  9.6    9.3  9.8    10.4  9.2 
Ukraine  9.1    9.2  9.0    10.1  7.4 
N  162    73  89    100  62 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations 
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Table 6: Probit Regressions: determinants of migration     
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  baseline model  with networks  with HC  Bel, Mol, Ukr  only rural  non rural  men  women 
female  -0.049  -0.047  -0.045  -0.072  -0.049  -0.050     
  (4.36)***  (4.28)***  (4.38)***  (3.89)***  (2.46)**  (3.95)***     
married  -0.018  -0.017  -0.008  -0.008  -0.055  0.000  0.002  -0.021 
  (1.26)  (1.24)  (0.59)  (0.33)  (1.91)*  (0.00)  (0.05)  (1.64) 
age1725  -0.001  -0.003  -0.018  -0.031  -0.065  0.008  -0.082  0.029 
  (0.09)  (0.21)  (1.26)  (1.15)  (2.41)**  (0.44)  (2.71)***  (1.71)* 
age2635  -0.004  -0.005  -0.009  -0.005  -0.040  0.006  -0.014  -0.003 
  (0.32)  (0.34)  (0.72)  (0.21)  (1.63)  (0.40)  (0.49)  (0.20) 
age5076  -0.041  -0.040  -0.028  -0.066  -0.049  -0.027  -0.060  -0.027 
  (2.94)***  (2.86)***  (2.18)**  (2.68)***  (2.07)**  (1.68)*  (2.40)**  (1.89)* 
kid05  -0.023  -0.024  -0.020  -0.050  -0.035  -0.018  -0.026  -0.025 
  (1.59)  (1.72)*  (1.53)  (2.11)**  (1.32)  (1.24)  (0.87)  (2.05)** 
kid510  -0.013  -0.012  -0.012  -0.034  0.037  -0.025  -0.042  0.005 
  (0.90)  (0.88)  (0.96)  (1.46)  (1.29)  (1.70)*  (1.68)*  (0.37) 
elderly75  -0.007  -0.007  -0.006  -0.023  0.037  -0.028  -0.001  -0.009 
  (0.32)  (0.34)  (0.33)  (0.57)  (1.01)  (1.12)  (0.03)  (0.45) 
loweredu  0.033  0.032  0.041  0.075  0.064  -0.003  0.057  0.028 
  (1.41)  (1.41)  (1.80)*  (1.94)*  (1.86)*  (0.08)  (1.34)  (1.13) 
university  -0.021  -0.022  -0.030  -0.057  -0.053  -0.024  -0.090  -0.004 
  (1.80)*  (1.91)*  (2.78)***  (2.68)***  (1.99)**  (1.99)**  (4.14)***  (0.30) 
westfriend    0.013  -0.003  0.004  -0.000  0.007  0.013  0.005 
    (1.14)  (0.33)  (0.21)  (0.00)  (0.56)  (0.64)  (0.45) 
russfriend    0.015  0.018  0.043  0.053  0.006  0.036  0.002 
    (1.23)  (1.58)  (1.93)*  (2.03)**  (0.43)  (1.50)  (0.20) 
westlanguage      0.032  0.086  0.079  0.036  0.113  0.021 
      (2.73)***  (3.85)***  (2.61)***  (2.80)***  (3.91)***  (1.74)* 
INVEST      0.094           
      (7.02)***           
rural  -0.004  -0.003  -0.002  0.002      -0.001  0.006 
  (0.32)  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.08)      (0.03)  (0.47) 
armenia  -0.056  -0.057  -0.038    -0.062  -0.044  -0.042  -0.047 
  (4.27)***  (4.25)***  (2.96)***    (2.63)***  (3.02)***  (1.43)  (3.77)*** 
belarus  -0.015  -0.014  -0.008  -0.030  -0.058  -0.007  -0.008  -0.022 
  (1.14)  (1.08)  (0.62)  (1.41)  (2.25)**  (0.46)  (0.31)  (1.92)* 
georgia  -0.072  -0.072  -0.065    -0.070  -0.062  -0.105  -0.048 
  (5.09)***  (5.14)***  (5.28)***    (2.55)**  (4.21)***  (3.62)***  (3.99)*** 
moldova  0.001  -0.003  0.004  -0.002  0.003  -0.005  0.001  -0.005 
  (0.09)  (0.23)  (0.29)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.27)  (0.02)  (0.39) 
Observations  2003  2003  2003  1200  628  1375  730  1273 
Pseudo R-squared  0.10  0.10  0.16  0.07  0.15  0.12  0.13  0.13 
Test: kid05=kid510=0  98.499  101.111  162.137  59.217  47.446  77.982  58.389  70.575 
Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations   30 
Table 7: Multinominal logit Regression of migration destination                
 
  baseline model  with networks  with language 
  EU  Russia  other  EU  Russia  other  EU  Russia  other 
female  -0.542  -0.997  -0.173  -0.550  -1.015  -0.184  -0.744  -0.992  -0.154 
  (2.15)**  (4.10)***  (0.19)  (2.18)**  (4.13)***  (0.21)  (2.83)***  (3.99)***  (0.17) 
married  -0.492  0.068  -0.775  -0.483  0.052  -0.826  -0.274  0.028  -0.842 
  (1.59)  (0.20)  (1.36)  (1.54)  (0.15)  (1.58)  (0.84)  (0.08)  (1.55) 
age1725  -0.123  -0.105  1.528  -0.125  -0.154  1.465  -0.673  -0.090  1.591 
  (0.34)  (0.28)  (1.52)  (0.34)  (0.40)  (1.38)  (1.67)*  (0.24)  (1.35) 
age2635  -0.088  -0.065  1.275  -0.116  -0.025  1.168  -0.229  -0.015  1.230 
  (0.26)  (0.19)  (1.17)  (0.34)  (0.08)  (0.99)  (0.61)  (0.05)  (0.99) 
age5076  -1.016  -0.789  -32.839  -1.010  -0.763  -32.721  -0.860  -0.772  -30.749 
  (2.08)**  (1.92)*  (30.88)***  (2.06)**  (1.85)*  (31.94)***  (1.76)*  (1.87)*  (30.83)*** 
kid05  -0.537  -0.317  -0.414  -0.562  -0.313  -0.402  -0.594  -0.313  -0.462 
  (1.25)  (0.91)  (0.44)  (1.31)  (0.92)  (0.45)  (1.32)  (0.93)  (0.49) 
kid510  -0.165  -0.285  -33.678  -0.137  -0.285  -33.385  -0.043  -0.283  -31.379 
  (0.45)  (0.85)  (56.11)***  (0.37)  (0.84)  (56.16)***  (0.11)  (0.84)  (54.15)*** 
elderly75  -0.514  0.362  -33.078  -0.494  0.377  -32.979  -0.428  0.360  -30.963 
  (0.83)  (0.75)  (62.50)***  (0.80)  (0.78)  (66.16)***  (0.69)  (0.74)  (58.25)*** 
loweredu  -0.557  0.671  1.617  -0.510  0.669  1.610  -0.272  0.659  1.569 
  (0.76)  (1.94)*  (0.86)  (0.70)  (1.93)*  (0.88)  (0.36)  (1.91)*  (0.85) 
university  -0.186  -0.906  0.938  -0.203  -0.936  0.843  -0.685  -0.868  0.948 
  (0.65)  (2.43)**  (1.15)  (0.70)  (2.53)**  (1.18)  (2.18)**  (2.23)**  (1.27) 
rural  0.142  -0.131  -0.491  0.186  -0.149  -0.423  0.408  -0.171  -0.506 
  (0.55)  (0.54)  (0.77)  (0.71)  (0.61)  (0.76)  (1.46)  (0.70)  (0.98) 
westfriend        0.632  -0.183  0.681  0.466  -0.165  0.690 
        (1.81)*  (0.46)  (0.73)  (1.32)  (0.41)  (0.73) 
russfriend        0.049  0.973  -33.647  0.050  0.954  -31.680 
        (0.08)  (2.51)**  (58.48)***  (0.08)  (2.47)**  (54.16)*** 
westlanguage              1.932  -0.232  -0.459 
              (6.14)***  (0.75)  (0.60) 
armenia  -2.331  -0.497  0.149  -2.332  -0.469  0.071  -2.090  -0.499  -0.003 
  (3.86)***  (1.12)  (0.10)  (3.89)***  (1.06)  (0.05)  (3.55)***  (1.13)  (0.00) 
belarus  -0.503  0.351  -0.530  -0.470  0.381  -0.571  -0.592  0.388  -0.514 
  (1.73)*  (0.96)  (0.39)  (1.60)  (1.04)  (0.42)  (1.91)*  (1.07)  (0.39) 
moldova  -0.930  0.888  0.546  -1.060  0.859  0.385  -0.980  0.843  0.420 
  (2.73)***  (2.64)***  (0.32)  (2.93)***  (2.48)**  (0.21)  (2.66)***  (2.41)**  (0.23) 
georgia  -2.229  -2.527  0.185  -2.242  -2.579  0.190  -2.196  -2.590  0.195 
  (4.12)***  (2.44)**  (0.17)  (4.19)***  (2.48)**  (0.17)  (4.05)***  (2.49)**  (0.18) 
Constant  -1.437  -2.346  -6.034  -1.523  -2.368  -5.948  -2.362  -2.313  -5.850 
  (3.57)***  (5.16)***  (3.99)***  (3.76)***  (5.10)***  (4.12)***  (5.35)***  (4.85)***  (4.18)*** 
Observations  2003  2003  2003 
Ps R-squared  0.12  0.13  0.16 
Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                   
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations     31 
Table 8: ZINB and NBREG model: migration duration             
  ZINB  ZINB    ZINB  NBREG    NBREG  ZINB 




  men  women    urban  rural 
female  -0.281  -0.384          -1.431  -0.179 
  (1.60)  (2.00)**          (5.08)***  (0.82) 
married  -0.438  -0.465    0.070  -0.950    -0.360  -0.626 
  (2.12)**  (2.18)**    (0.25)  (2.46)**    (0.95)  (2.29)** 
age1725  -0.261  -0.406    -0.418  0.163    -0.057  -0.705 
  (1.11)  (1.72)*    (1.24)  (0.35)    (0.13)  (2.51)** 
age2635  -0.008  0.069    0.512  -0.278    0.523  -0.696 
  (0.04)  (0.31)    (2.11)**  (0.55)    (1.20)  (2.58)*** 
age5076  0.488  0.575    0.062  -0.530    -0.140  0.306 
  (1.80)*  (2.08)**    (0.22)  (1.11)    (0.35)  (0.92) 
kid05  -0.196  -0.176    -0.776  -0.016    -0.385  -0.412 
  (0.79)  (0.69)    (2.78)***  (0.03)    (0.85)  (0.98) 
kid510  0.448  0.367    -0.350  0.118    -0.511  0.256 
  (1.77)*  (1.42)    (1.18)  (0.25)    (1.11)  (0.91) 
elderly75  0.315  0.024    0.236  -0.551    -1.102  0.210 
  (1.04)  (0.08)    (0.80)  (1.03)    (2.54)**  (0.46) 
loweredu  -0.421  -0.218    0.156  0.229    -0.144  -0.150 
  (1.63)  (0.81)    (0.58)  (0.38)    (0.24)  (0.64) 
university  -0.303  -0.390    -1.144  -0.056    -0.660  0.575 
  (1.37)  (1.74)*    (3.29)***  (0.14)    (1.72)*  (1.57) 
westlanguage    0.428    0.685  0.743    0.635  0.590 
    (2.58)***    (3.43)***  (2.34)**    (1.94)*  (3.03)*** 
INVEST    0.509    0.143  2.259    2.307  0.024 
    (2.72)***    (0.82)  (6.66)***    (6.67)***  (0.14) 
rural  -0.220  -0.211    -0.371  -0.168       
  (1.27)  (1.22)    (2.00)**  (0.42)       
armenia  -0.722  -0.362    0.449  -2.516    -0.605  0.389 
  (1.92)*  (0.95)    (1.25)  (4.37)***    (1.31)  (0.61) 
belarus  -0.826  -0.749    -0.549  -1.454    -0.568  -0.373 
  (3.85)***  (3.45)***    (2.27)**  (2.65)***    (1.37)  (0.86) 
moldova  0.186  0.329    0.275  0.393    0.826  0.741 
  (0.93)  (1.59)    (1.30)  (0.76)    (1.64)  (3.06)*** 
georgia  -0.929  -1.208    -2.476  -2.851    -1.910  -0.603 
  (1.93)*  (2.68)***    (4.03)***  (6.03)***    (4.02)***  (0.83) 
Constant  2.664  2.160    1.908  -0.739    -0.159  2.055 
  (10.51)***  (7.76)***    (5.39)***  (1.48)    (0.30)  (6.62)*** 
Observations  2003  2003    730  1273    1375  628 
Zero observations  1839  1839    639        565 
Likelihood ratio test  329.591  285.449    97.739  316.43    269.20  37.933 
Voung test  3.286  1.654    4.194        3.257 
sig.  0.000  0.049    0.000        0.003 
R2_p          0.074    0.059   
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations 
 




Table 9a: Correlation matrices for instrumental variables 
 
  iv_westfriend  westfriend  west 
iv_westfriend  1.0000     
westfriend  0.2878*    1.0000   
west  -0.0259     0.0725*  1.0000 
 
  iv_russfriend  russfriend  russia 
iv_russfriend  1.0000     
russfriend  0.1832*    1.0000   
russia  -0.0162     0.0962*  1.0000 
 
  iv_westlanguage  westlanguage  west 
iv_westlanguage  1.0000     
westlanguage  0.2195*    1.0000   
west  0.0197     0.1857*  1.0000 
* significant at 5% 











Table 9b: Estimated first stage residuals for the Rivers-Vuong approach (endogeneity test) 
 
  iv_westfriend  iv_russfriend  iv_westlanguage 
destination West  -1.79   
(0.074)* 
-2.52   
(0.012)** 
-0.02    
(0.983) 
destination Russia  -1.82    
(0.070)* 
0.48    
(0.628) 
0.46    
(0.647) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations 
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Table 9c: IV Regression for migration to EU     
 
  (1)  (2) 
  Probit  IV Probit (Second stage) 
female  -0.014  -0.398 
  (2.33)**  (2.71)*** 
married  -0.012  -0.183 
  (1.60)  (1.04) 
age1725  -0.001  0.271 
  (0.12)  (1.05) 
age2635  -0.003  -0.020 
  (0.35)  (0.10) 
age5076  -0.017  -0.642 
  (2.31)**  (2.44)** 
kid05  -0.011  -0.344 
  (1.49)  (1.62) 
kid510  -0.001  -0.119 
  (0.11)  (0.60) 
elderly75  -0.003  -0.060 
  (0.30)  (0.20) 
loweredu  -0.005  -0.014 
  (0.42)  (0.04) 
university  -0.006  -0.061 
  (0.92)  (0.33) 
westfriend  0.019  -0.311 
  (2.92)***  (0.28) 
russfriend  -0.018  -3.214 
  (2.79)***  (2.32)** 
rural  0.004  -0.049 
  (0.58)  (0.30) 
armenia  -0.030  -0.534 
  (4.41)***  (1.43) 
belarus  -0.008  -0.044 
  (1.20)  (0.18) 
georgia  -0.030  -0.879 
  (4.45)***  (3.45)*** 
moldova  -0.021  -0.094 
  (3.55)***  (0.24) 
Constant    -0.303 
    (0.53) 
Observations  2003  2003 
Pseudo R-squared  0.13   
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2(2)    5.28 
p-value    0.071 
Robust z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Note: for migration with destination EU27, we instrument friendship networks to the EU and Russia with 
iv_westfriend, iv_russfriend, and orthodox. As a robustness check, we use the instrument ethnic russian and 
find similar results. 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculation. 